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ARTICLE 
 
Insurance as a Mitigation Mechanism:  
Managing International Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions through Nationwide Mandatory 
Climate Change Catastrophe Insurance 
ANASTASIA TELESETSKY* 
"The insurance industry must now seize the opportunity to make 
a difference not just to the future of our own industry, but to the 
future of society." 
—Lloyds of London1 
“It is in insurers’ direct interest that government is encouraged to 
manage the mitigation of climate-related risks and adapt to 
changing climate.”  
—Pricewaterhouse Cooper2 
  INTRODUCTION 
 Living at sea level, the Dutch are constructing a climate 
defense system, which is the envy of countries such as 
Bangladesh that cannot afford the public infrastructure to shore 
up its coastline.  With current estimates of adaptation ranging 
from $ 49 billion to $171 billion per year,3 those States which fail 
to climate-proof their cities, may face considerable costs for future 
disaster relief and recovery if we fail to adequately mitigate the 
 
* University of Idaho, Associate Professor 
 1. 360 Risk Project, Lloyds of London Climate Change, Adapt or Bust 21 
(2006). 
 2. Shamiram Nissan & Jon Williams, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Insurance 
Digest, Insurance and Climate Change Challenge 4 (2009), http://www.pwc.com/ 
gx/en/insurance/insurance-digest-2.html. 
 3. Department of Economic and Affairs, United Nations, World Economic 
Social Survey 2009: Promoting Development, Saving the Planet 155-56 (2009) 
(amounts are in U.S. currency). 
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quantity of greenhouse gases being emitted.  While Africa and 
Asia will bear the major brunt of future climate change given the 
lack of basic disaster prevention in these regions,4 climate change 
disasters are by no means confined to these two continents.  As 
suggested by the deadly heat waves in Europe and the recent 
bushfires in Australia, climate induced disasters strike 
indiscriminately.  Relative affluence is no guarantee of safety.  At 
present, current estimates of the increase in humanitarian costs 
associated with climate change disaster vary widely from 32% 
increase in current costs based on more frequent disaster events 
to 1600% based on climate related events that are both more 
frequent and intense.5 
What if 104 degree Fahrenheit heatwaves like the one in 
Europe that claimed 70,000 lives were to become regular events?6  
There is some evidence that weather related disasters are on the 
rise.  According to the United States National Climatic Data 
Center, this past decade has been the warmest decade in history 
with temperatures almost one degree Fahrenheit above previous 
averages. 7  According to the report, there have been numerous 
weather disaster events that some contend are correlated with 
anthropogenic influences on climate change including the 
deadliest tornado in Oklahoma history, the largest wildfire in Los 
Angeles history, heaviest snowfall in China in fifty-five years, and 
the deadliest typhoon in Taiwan for five decades.8 
 
 4. Small Island Developing States in the Pacific and other Lesser Developed 
Countries are also especially vulnerable. Guyana may lose up to 19% of its GDP 
by 2030 if the floods predicted to accompany climate change materialize. See 
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE ADAPTATION WORKING GROUP, SHAPING CLIMATE 
RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 39 (2009). 
 5. MACKINNON WEBSTER ET AL., FEINSTEIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER, THE 
HUMANITARIAN COSTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2008). 
 6. Press Release, European Union, Climate Change: Europe Must Take 
Adaptation Measures to Lessen Impacts of Current and Future Warming (June 
29, 2007). 
 7. Randolph E. Schmid, 2000s Warmest Decade on Record, Government 
Reports, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Jan. 19, 2010, available at http://www.press 
democrat.com/article/20100119/ARTICLES/100119434; see Press Release, World 
Meteorological Organization, 2000-2009, The Warmest Decade (Dec. 8, 2009), 
[hereinafter WMO Press Release], available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/media 
centre/press_releases/pr_869_en.html. 
 8. WMO Press Release, supra note 7. 
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As our global population increases with greater 
concentrations of people in cities especially cities in coastal 
locations, extreme weather events become both deadlier and more 
expensive.  Billion dollar disasters no longer surprise the 
insurance industries.  In 2009, a combination of flooding, 
thunderstorms, wildfires, and tornadoes resulted in $9.3 billion 
dollars of damage.9  In 2008 with its longer hurricane season, 
damages from severe weather events amounted to $56.5 billion.10  
In countries such as the United States (U.S.), private insurance 
covers a major portion of casualty and property damages.  But not 
all damages will be fully covered. Public infrastructure, 
government buildings, and public amenities are not insured or 
the insurance coverage may be insufficient to cover catastrophic 
losses.11 
 This paper proposes mandatory climate change catastrophe 
insurance as a risk-sharing mechanism to distribute future 
climate change disaster relief costs between major greenhouse 
gas emitting industries and the government.  This article argues 
that mandatory catastrophe risk insurance for major greenhouse 
gas emitters will deliver necessary financial coverage for future 
climate disasters as well as compel timely climate change 
mitigation on the part of major emitters.  The first part of this 
paper offers mandatory climate change catastrophe insurance as 
an additional market tool to the existing proposals for emission 
trading schemes and carbon taxes.  This part begins with a 
summary of the costs of responding to a climate change disaster 
followed by a description of government involvement in delivering 
national disaster relief for natural disasters such as earthquakes 
and flooding.  The paper concludes that even if governments 
ultimately become the insurer of last resort in catastrophic 
climate change events, that industries should be held accountable 
for having contributed to the disaster through “business as usual” 
 
 9. National Climactic Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, Billion Dollar U.S. Weather Disasters, http://www.ncdc.noaa. 
gov/oa/reports/billionz.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
 10. Id. 
 11. FEMA: The Disaster Process and Disaster Aid Programs, 
http://www.fema.gov/hazard/dproc.shtm (last visited Aug. 18, 2010); see also 
Stephan Hochrainer and Reinhard Mechler, Assessing Financial and Economic 
Vulnerability to Natural Hazards in ASSESSING VULNERABILITY TO GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 185 (Anthony Patt et al. eds., 2009). 
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practices.  After reviewing government’s existing disaster relief 
programs, the paper surveys the insurance industry’s climate 
change mitigation efforts.  Since there are no ongoing insurance 
efforts to connect current corporate actions with future climate 
change impacts, this paper proposes that governments adopt 
regulations mandating catastrophe risk insurance for major 
greenhouse gas emitters.  The insurance would serve the goals of 
both corrective and distributive justice. 
 The second part of this article suggests that, in the context 
of climate change, mandatory insurance fulfills the equitable 
goals of the polluter pays principle by legally allocating 
responsibility for climate change to industries. In the context of 
future climate change disaster, the polluter pays principle is 
primarily an equitable principle for restitution and corrective 
justice rather than an economic efficiency tool. 
PART ONE:  
MANDATORY CLIMATE CHANGE CATASTROPHE 
INSURANCE 
If communities remain vulnerable to extreme weather events 
triggered by climate change, the social and economic costs of 
climate disaster will be significant.  In a March 2009 meeting on 
extreme weather events, experts affiliated with the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) observed 
that the “frequency, intensity, and length” of certain types of 
events has increased.12  The IPCC experts proposed insurance as 
a possible approach for addressing disaster management and 
transferring risk rationally.13 
This paper argues that new insurance products need to be 
offered that have the potential not just to compensate for climate 
change losses through effective risk management strategies but 
also to provide a needed kick-start for mitigation of emissions.  
The next section of this paper describes one possible insurance 
product that could provide payments to national, state, and 
municipal governments to cover rescue costs, delivery of 
 
 12. Vicente Barros et al., Scoping Paper- IPCC Report: Managing the Risks of 
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation 2 (Apr. 
2009). 
 13. Id. at 4. 
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essentials to disaster victims, losses of public property, and other 
specified damages to communities injured by climate 
catastrophes. 
 A.  Costs of Climate Disasters 
There are many types of costs associated with disaster and 
not all costs are easily monetized.  Because the focus of this 
article is on insurance and insurance requires monetization of 
losses in order to calculate risks, this section will focus 
exclusively on summarizing economic cost studies associated with 
future climate disasters. 
The projected costs for climate change catastrophe damages 
range widely depending on the assumptions made by various 
studies.  Economists consider various factors to be catastrophic 
losses for the purpose of calculating climate change damages.  
Some of the factors for which catastrophic costs have been 
calculated include wildfire damages, damages to crops, damages 
to marine resources, salinization of water systems, power 
outages, and human health risks including injuries caused by 
floods. 
The years 2008 and 2009 were studded with weather 
anomalies triggering humanitarian crises resulting in emergency 
relief to more than 211 million people,14 which for comparison is 
about two-thirds of the U.S. population.  In Asia, heavy monsoon 
rains displaced half a million people in India, Nepal and 
Pakistan.15  Flooding and cyclones impacted 1.2 million people in 
Angola, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.16  While it was flooding in 
Southern Africa, Syria was experiencing droughts affecting 1 
million people.17  The United Nations concluded that, “the 
increased severity and frequency of hazard events-other than 
 
 14. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of 
the United Nations, 2, delivered to the Economic and Social Council and the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. E/2009/87, A/64/84 (May 28, 2009) [hereinafter 
U.N. Economic and Social Council Report]. 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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earthquakes and volcanoes- are more than 90% likely to be a 
result of climate change.”18 
In terms of severe weather events, U.S. economist Nordhaus 
predicts that at least .08% of the U.S. gross domestic product 
(GDP) ($10 billion) would be needed to deal with increases in 
hurricane intensity.19  British economist Nicholas Stern predicts 
that losses from extreme weather could reach 0.5–1% of world 
GDP by 2050.20  In particular, disaster planners worry about the 
survival of public infrastructure during weather disasters.  Using 
55 years of Munich Re insurance loss data, members of the IPCC 
calculate that the average loss to infrastructure from catastrophic 
climate change would be between $21.1 billion and $87.7 billion 
per year.21  If states are unable to adapt to climate change 
impacts or mitigate these disasters, damages from severe climate 
change induced weather events are estimated to be increasing at 
an annual rate of 2-6%, amounting to potential global losses of 
$850 billion to $1.3 trillion.22  While there is no consensus among 
economists on the actual costs associated with future climate 
change catastrophes, the costs will not be negligible. 
The historic budgets of national government disaster relief 
agencies have not taken into account the predicted increase in 
intensity and frequency of severe weather events.  For example, 
in 2000, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) listed a $320 million annual appropriation to their 
disaster fund plus an additional $24 billion of emergency 
appropriations distributed over the course of 10 years.23  Over the 
 
 18. Id. at 2. 
 19. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, THE ECONOMICS OF HURRICANES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 19 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/documents 
/hurr_083109.pdf. 
 20. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 149 (2007). 
 21. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL FLOWS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE, 121, para. 463 
(2007), available at http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_ 
mechanism/application/pdf/background_paper.pdf. 
 22. Id. at 124, para. 477. 
 23. Letter from Stanley J. Czerwinski, Assoc. Dir., Housing and Cmty. Dev. 
Issues, Res. Cmty, and Econ. Dev. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office to Hon. 
Christopher S. Bond, Chairman, & Hon. Barbara A. Mikulski, Ranking Minority 
Member, Subcomm. on Va., HUD, and Indep. Agencies Comm. on 
Appropriations, U.S. Senate (Aug. 29, 2000) in U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/5
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course of fiscal years 2004 through 2008, FEMA spent 
approximately $16.3 billion on goods and services.24  If multiple 
events such as the 2008 Hurricane Ike were to happen in 
succession,25 FEMA will face budget shortfalls if Congress does 
not increase FEMA’s budget or allocate additional emergency 
appropriations. 
Governments are allocating funds to assist with adaptation, 
such as the $2.9 billion Dutch budget to rezone flood areas and 
reposition dikes26 and the proposed $42 billion set aside by the 
United Kingdom government to raise the Thames flood barriers.27 
These funds are earmarked for infrastructure projects to adapt to 
gradual climate change impacts, such as sea level rise and not to 
respond to costs associated with extreme weather events.  As the 
next section explains, governments are traditionally the primary 
source of funding for disaster relief and many governments may 
not be well equipped to handle the financial burden of multiple 
climate-induced disasters. 
 B.  Government’s Traditional Role in Disaster Relief 
Historically, national and subnational governments provide 
financial relief and compensation when a natural disaster occurs 
that damages property and requires human rescue.  The central 
role of government in disaster relief is in response to private 
insurers refusing to cover catastrophic “act of God” damages that 
 
DISASTER RELIEF FUND: FEMA’S ESTIMATES OF FUNDING REQUIREMENTS CAN BE 
IMPROVED, GAO/RCED-00-182 at 1 (2000). 
 24. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FEMA’S DISASTER CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, OIG-10-
53, at 2 (2010). 
 25. Hurricane Ike is one of the most costly recent disasters on record with 
private losses of $17.6 billion and $2.4 billion in claims under the National Flood 
Insurance Program, see HOWARD KUNREUTHER & ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN, 
ENCOURAGING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: LONG-TERM FLOOD INSURANCE 2 
(2009), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/RFF-IB-09-13. 
pdf. 
 26. David Satterthwaite et al., Adapting to Climate Change in Urban Areas, 
International Institute for Environment and Development 89 (Human 
Settlements Discussion Paper Series, Theme: Climate Change & Cities No.1 
2007), available at http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/10549IIED.pdf. 
 27. MARCO GRASSO, JUSTICE IN FUNDING ADAPTATION UNDER THE 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 74 (2010). 
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are not specifically contemplated during the underwriting of a 
given policy. 
Since only about 20% of global disaster losses are privately 
insured,28 citizens generally depend on their governments as the 
ultimate reinsurer for property losses and the provider of 
emergency financial relief.  Most governments in industrialized 
countries are involved in some sort of risk management strategy 
as either primary insurers or reinsurers of extraordinary risks.  
Depending on the country, coverage may be voluntary or 
compulsory. Some of the compensation arrangements are ad hoc, 
while others operate through state or quasi-state institutions.  In 
some States, the party who ultimately pays for the national 
disaster compensation schemes will be either citizens who own 
property insurance (e.g. France), or the tax-paying population at 
large (e.g. U.S.). 
In the U.S., disaster relief is delivered primarily by the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA).29  As a federal government agency, 
FEMA’s budget is derived from national taxes.  Other States have 
implemented different disaster relief management approaches.  
In 1982, the French government created a nationwide disaster 
compensation scheme.30  It covers earthquakes, floods, landslides, 
hailstorms, avalanches, tsunamis, and droughts.  All property 
damage policies sold by private insurers include compulsory 
natural disaster coverage with rates set by the government.  The 
coverage is triggered when 1) a natural disaster is officially 
declared by the government; 2) the damaged property was 
protected under the policy; and 3) the claimant proves that the 
property was damaged by the natural disaster.  After an insuree 
meets a mandatory deductible that is calculated by the 
government, the insurer pays for material losses as well as 
business interruptions.  In order to guarantee the solvency of this 
 
 28. Reinhard Mechler, Financing Disaster Risks in Developing and Emerging 
Economy Countries, in FLORE-ANNE MESSY, POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE 
CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE, NO. 8 at 105, 116  (2005). 
 29. See The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
5121 (1988)). 
 30. See Law No. 82-600 of July 13, 1982, Journal Officiel de la Republique 
Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 4, 1992, p. 187. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/5
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system, the government offers natural disaster reinsurance to the 
property insurers with unlimited coverage. 31 
In Spain, the Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros is a 
society-wide compensation scheme for extraordinary risks and 
was created in response to the man-made losses during the 
Spanish Civil War.32  The organization’s work is grounded on the 
principles of solidarity among the insured, compensation for risks 
and hazards across different regions, cooperation between the 
private market, and the public government, and reliance on 
public funds as a last resort.33  It is run as a statewide business 
attached to the Ministry of Economy and Finance but has assets 
and liabilities that are separate from the state.  It pays claims 
when an extraordinary risk is not specifically covered by another 
insurance policy or the risk is covered but the company cannot 
meet its financial obligations.  The types of risk that are covered 
include floods (except for the flooding of artificial canals), volcanic 
eruption, sea surges, earthquakes, storms including windstorms 
with winds greater than 135 km/h, terrorism, and civil unrest.34  
To create a sufficient capital reserve, the Consorcio collects 
compulsory sums that are levied on all accident and property 
insurance policies. The Consorcio puts these partially tax-
deductible sums in a stabilization reserve.  Historically, the 
Consorcio has also temporarily covered risks where there is no 
market activity to protect parties, such as the risk of terrorism 
and war after the September 11, 2001, attacks.  Unlike the 
French model described above, compensation from the Consorcio 
does not depend on an official declaration of a disaster by the 
state.  The General Manager of the Consorcio is aware that 
climate change will present a challenge to the Consorcio and has 
observed that even though the insurance industry is not the 
exclusive solution to compensation for climatic events, “it will 
 
 31. See generally CCR, http://www.ccr.fr/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). (Caisse 
Centrale de Réassurance-website for State-owned reinsurance company that 
provides reinsurance coverage for French natural disasters). 
 32. See generally Ignacio Machetti, The Spanish Experience in the 
Management of Extraordinary Risks, Including Terrorism, in FLORE-ANNE 
MESSY, POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE, NO. 8 
at 337 (2005). 
 33. Id. at 341. 
 34. Id. at 342. 
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have to offer insurance alternatives according to each climatic 
reality.”35 
New Zealand introduced the Earthquake Commission 
Natural Disaster Fund in 1993 to cover natural disaster losses for 
residential properties.36  The coverage is compulsory whenever 
fire insurance is purchased.37  The premium for natural disaster 
coverage is collected by private insurers and then sent to the 
Earthquake Commission, a state entity, which administers the 
natural disaster insurance, including processing the claims and 
organizing reinsurance.38  As with the French compensation 
scheme, the government is the ultimate reinsurer. 
In the Netherlands, some government compensation may be 
provided under the Calamities and Compensation Act.39  The 
available compensation is limited to those situations in which a 
flood results in a disruption of public safety and requires a 
coordination of civil services.  Damage caused by storm surges is 
not covered, because it is considered too difficult to calculate the 
costs of such events.40 
Some countries such as Australia use funding mechanisms 
created from tax revenue.  Through its Natural Disaster Relief 
and Recovery Arrangements fund, the federal government 
provides post-catastrophe funding to both States and Territories 
to cover specific expenses.  The fund is intended to supplement 
private insurance.41 
In Turkey, a national disaster insurance scheme provides 
relief to Turkish households located within municipalities in the 
 
 35. Id. at 347. 
 36. Earthquake Commission Act 1993, Public Act 84, Section 13 (N.Z.),  
available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0084/latest/DLM305 
968.html; see generally EQC, Earthquake Commission, EQC Insurance, 
http://www.eqc.govt.nz/insurance.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
 37. Earthquake Commission Act 1993, Public Act 84, Section 18 (N.Z.).  
 38. Id. at Section 5. 
 39. Alberto Monti, Policy Approaches to the Financial Management of Large-
Scale Disasters, in POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF 
LARGE-SCALE CATASTROPHES, NO. 12 at 82 (2008). 
 40. W. J. W. Botzen & J. C. J. M. van den Bergh, Insurance Against Climate 
Change and Flooding in the Netherlands: Present, Future, and Comparison with 
Other Countries, 28 RISK ANALYSIS 413, 416 (2008). 
 41. See NEIL WEEKS, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF CATASTROPHES IN AUSTRALIA 
(n.d.), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/33/38120102.pdf. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/5
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event of an earthquake.42  Depending on where a home is located, 
how the home is constructed, and what risk-reduction measures 
households have taken, the insurer calculates a premium.  Every 
household is required to pay an insurance premium to a privately 
administered, public fund.  The World Bank provides another 
layer of reinsurance in the form of low-interest loans to cover 
losses that occur before there is sufficient capital in the insurance 
fund to cover them, or where losses are unusually high.43 
In Japan, a similar earthquake reinsurance program exists 
with the Japanese government, rather than the World Bank 
serving as the insurer of last resort.  With the creation of the 
Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Company,44 the public and 
private sector share the responsibility of compensating for losses.  
When a homeowner purchases insurance for earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis, the private insurance company 
carries liability up to 75 billion yen for each earthquake. 
Anything above this sum, up to approximately 1 trillion yen ($11 
million), is carried 50% by the insurance company and 50% by the 
government.  Anything above this sum, up to maximum payment 
limit per event of 4.5 trillion yen ($50 million), is 95% carried by 
the government, and 5% by the insurance industry.  This model 
provides a critical role for the private sector in loss-management 
and prevention up to a certain point, after which the government 
becomes the primary risk manager for large losses. 
What do all these government sponsored or government run 
risk management schemes suggest in the context of climate 
change?  These schemes all provide primarily public models and 
mechanisms for compensating for climate change damages.  They 
point to a society wide inclination to allow the government or a 
quasi-governmental agency to be the primary risk manager for 
catastrophic disaster relief.  The proliferation of such schemes 
 
 42. Monti, supra note 39 at 95-99. (summarizing Turkey’s Insurance Decree 
Law). 
 43. D. Kuzek, K. Campbell & M. Khater, The Use of Probabilistic Risk 
Models for Managing Earthquake Insurance Risks: Example for Turkey, in 
CATASTROPHE RISK AND REINSURANCE: A COUNTRY RISK MANAGEMENT 
PERSPECTIVE, World Bank 41-64 (E. Gurenko ed. 2004). 
 44. See generally Non-Life Insurance Rating Organization of Japan & K. 
Kawachimaru, Disaster Risk Management in Japan, in FLORE-ANNE MESSY, 
POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE: CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE, NO. 8 at 337 
(2005). 
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means that the insurance industry is reluctant to underwrite 
extraordinary catastrophic risks. 
Unlike some of the catastrophes contemplated in the design 
of these government disaster relief schemes, climate change 
catastrophes, as the General Manager of the Consorcio de 
Compensacion de Seguros noted, produce qualitatively different 
sorts of risk than earthquakes.  Before scientists understood that 
ongoing human activities had direct impacts on climate change 
risks, there were few or no agents to hold directly responsible for 
a given natural disaster.  In some cases, builders of shoddy 
construction or municipalities who permitted building in 
floodplains might be held indirectly responsible for the ultimate 
damages suffered.  With the anthropogenic connection between 
extreme weather events and greenhouse gas emissions, however, 
there is now at least a partial chain of responsibility.  While it 
may be efficient for industry to allow government to shoulder the 
expenses of disaster relief, it is no longer equitable for 
government to be the primary financier of disaster relief.  If the 
government remains the loss manager of first resort for a climate 
change related disaster, the government absolves the private 
sector of its responsibility for contributing to the larger pollution 
problem and provides no incentive to change any “business as 
usual” practices.45 
What is needed is some regulatory tool to distribute financial 
losses in the event of a climate change catastrophe, between the 
government who currently shoulders the full burden of 
catastrophe relief and industries who will have contributed to the 
conditions triggering a disaster without paying for the 
consequences of those actions.  As explained below, private 
mandatory catastrophe risk insurance distributes financial losses 
in a catastrophe while satisfying goals of corrective justice 
encapsulated in the polluter pays principle. 
 
 45. This argument does not suggest that governments with their large fossil 
fuel driven bureaucracies and individual citizens with their carbon-intensive 
lifestyles are not somehow also responsible for contributing to ongoing climate 
change, but entrenched partisan politics in countries such as the U.S. and a lack 
of individual continuity regarding environmental values restrain the 
government and individuals from either setting stringent emissions targets or 
changing consumption patterns in a timely, meaningful fashion to avert further 
increases in greenhouse gas concentrations. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/5
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 C.  Insurance Industry Response to Climate Change 
The insurance and investment industries have been actively 
seeking to engage policymakers on climate change adaptation and 
mitigation issues.46  In 2008, the insurance industry recognized 
climate change as the number one threat to property and casualty 
insurance markets.47  The insurance industry recognizes that 
averting long-term catastrophic climate change impacts is 
necessary for the growth, profitability and viability of its 
industry.  After the Copenhagen talks, global reinsurer Munich 
Re was quick to comment that an international agreement 
reducing greenhouse gases is crucial in light of the $21 billion 
loss in 2009 and the $50 billion loss in 2008 for the insurance 
industry from impacts caused by natural disasters.48  Of the $80 
billion paid by the U.S. insurance industry in 2005, $62 billion of 
that was paid for weather-related losses in contrast to $40 billion 
dollars of losses in the 1990s and $4 billion dollars of losses in the 
1950s.49  Insurers speculate that large future catastrophes are 
likely to be more frequent and/or more damaging as a result of 
climate change since the number of severe weather-related 
catastrophes has already cost the insurance industry $1.6 trillion 
dollars since 1980 in claim payments.50 
Up to now, most of the effort of the insurance industry has 
either been in adapting insurance policies to leave them less 
exposed to predicted extreme weather events or in providing 
products that encourage investors in carbon mitigation services 
through financial loss insurance. Concerned about their 
 
 46. See, e.g., Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2010); Investor Network on Climate Risk, http://www.incr.com 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2010); Munich Re Climate Change and Insurance, 
http://www.munichre.com/en/ts/climate_change_and_insurance/default.aspx 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
 47. See generally Ernst & Young, Climate Change No. 1 in Top 10 Risks 
Facing the Insurance Industry, INSURANCE JOURNAL, Mar. 12, 2008, 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/03/12/88138.htm. 
 48. Ulrike Dauer, Munich Re: Climate Change Losses Set to Rise; Deal 
Needed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 
10001424052748703510304574625931956804434.html. 
 49. Paul Gutermann, et al., Storm Clouds Ahead: Climate Change and the 
Insurance Industry, in CLIMATE CHANGE: LITIGATION, REGULATION, AND RISK 
(Phyllis Skupien & Jodine Mayberry eds., 2008). 
 50. Gerrit Wiesmann, Munich Re Urges Climate Action, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/98a3ac0a-f4e2-11de-9cba-00144feab49a.html. 
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overexposure in certain geographical markets to impending 
severe weather events, insurers are refusing to renew property 
and casualty policies.  Insurers in areas perceived to have high 
risks from severe weather events such as Cape Cod, 
Massachusetts are withdrawing from certain markets because of 
growing concerns about undercapitalization for large-scale 
weather related events.51  Responding to the losses associated 
with Hurricane Katrina, three of the largest insurers Allstate, 
State Farm, and Liberty Mutual substantially reduced future 
exposure to Katrina-like events by turning down all new 
homeowner insurance requests in New Jersey, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, Maryland, Massachusetts and the eight downstate 
counties of New York.52 
Insurers are also offering products associated with the 
emerging carbon markets.  For example AIG is currently offering 
Carbon Credit Delivery Insurance to cover costs associated with 
investing in a Clean Development Mechanism Project or a Joint 
Implementation Project that does not deliver carbon credits 
because of technical problems or political risk problems.53  AIG 
also intends to offer Renewable Energy Certificate Insurance and 
Forest Carbon Sequestration Insurance.54  Most of these 
insurance products simply protect external mitigation efforts 
through programs such as the Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation and the Clean Development 
Mechanism.  These products do not directly stimulate emission 
mitigation through changes in existing business practices.  The 
following section explores an insurance product designed to 
stimulate systemic change, share financial responsibility for 
future climate change disasters between industries and 
governments, and hold industries accountable for greenhouse gas 
emitting business practices. 
 
 51. Karen Breslau , The Insurance Climate Change: Coastal Homeowners In 
The East Are Losing Their Policies Or Watching Premiums Skyrocket. Carriers 
Say That Global Warming Is To Blame, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007. 
 52. Paul Vitello, Home Insurers Canceling in East, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007. 
 53. AIG American International Group, Inc. Initiatives, http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=76115&p=irolgovresponsinitatives (last visited Aug. 18, 
2010). 
 54. Id. 
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 D.  Mandatory Private Climate Change Catastrophe 
Insurance as a Climate Change Mitigation Strategy 
1.  Introduction 
Why is mandatory private insurance part of the solution to 
stimulating mitigation efforts?  First, as professional risk 
managers, the insurance industry is one of the few business 
sectors that can catalyze rapid change from other private 
business sectors.  In fact, some insurance analysts envision a 
particularly active role for the industry in addressing the long-
term challenges of climate change as suggested by the following 
comments in a well-respected insurance industry journal.   
 
[The insurance industry] needs to prepare itself for the 
adverse effects that climate change may entail on its 
business and on its customers . . . [and] find solutions to 
reduce the economic risks linked to climatic evolutions and 
possibly to help society to cope with the root that causes 
global warning by promoting new technologies that should 
enhance mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.55   
 
Second, the private insurance industry has the market clout to 
demand changes since it is the world’s largest industry in terms 
of yearly revenues.  If the industry were a country, it would be 
the world’s third largest country with annual revenues of $3.2 
trillion a year.56 Almost 8% of the global GDP comes from 
insurance premiums.57 
Insurance works as a climate change mitigation strategy 
because insurance companies have the potential to catalyze 
fundamental behavioral change among insurees; insurance 
companies interested in their bottom line will not insure bad 
risks and where they insure highly risky activities they will 
demand high premiums to cover their risks.  Even though climate 
 
 55. Sophie Chemarina & Pierre Picarda, Editorial Insurance and Adaptation 
to Climate Change, THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE ISSUES AND 
PRACTICE 33, 66–70 (2008). 
 56. Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCIENCE 1040 (2005). 
 57. Evan Mills, Insurance as an Adaptation Strategy for Extreme Weather 
Events in Developing Countries and Economies in Transition, 12 (Lawrence 
Berkeley Nat’l Lab. Report No. 52220, 2004), available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5609x12n. 
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change research is vexed with unknowns, insurance companies 
can make some assumptions about future extreme weather 
events and construct insurance contracts that equitably pool and 
share risks. 
Insurance will also work as a mitigation strategy because it 
defines in advance the limits of a given risk and then “finds ways 
to insure what has previously been regarded as uninsurable.”58  A 
few decades ago, no one would have expected the insurance 
industry to be able to manage risks such as nuclear energy 
production and terrorist events through insurance products.  Yet, 
the insurance industry has developed products to spread the risk 
associated with these open-ended events by defining insurance 
parameters.  In the case of climate change, insurers can work in 
tandem with scientists and climate modelers to identify technical 
and economic parameters to define the risks of climate change 
based on agreed upon measurable triggers.59  To the extent that it 
can set some mutually agreed upon parameters, the industry can 
disaggregate the completely speculative risk of climate change 
into more discrete risks such as a sharp increase in temperature, 
an increase in sea level rise, a decrease in water supply, an 
increase in intensity of storm systems, or an increase in number 
of wildfires. 
Once risks have been identified and quantified and an 
adequate number of possible parties needing insurance have been 
identified to satisfy insurance’s “law of large numbers,”60 insurers 
need to set fair premiums based on the specific risk potential of 
 
 58. RICHARD ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, 
INSURANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 18 (2004). 
 59. P.A. Scott, et al., Human Contribution to the European Heat Wave of 
2003, 432 NATURE, 610–14 (2004). 
 60. This is a probability theorem that explains why insurance policies need to 
be system-wide or at least adopted across various risk groups in order for profits 
from a given insurance product to be stable. If only a few insurance policies were 
issued for a random risk such as an urban flood, then the insurance agency 
would have too broad of a deviation of risk to ensure sufficient capital from 
premiums to cover losses in the case of a flood resulting from a single clogged 
storm sewer. The more policies that are issued, the more stable long-term 
results become.  Not every insurance policy will be for the neighborhood next to 
the clogged storm sewer. If all of the insurance policies are for the same affected 
neighborhood, then the law of large numbers no longer works because the risks 
are no longer independent of each other. 
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each party seeking insurance.61  In the context of climate change, 
this means understanding the probability of a given event in 
relation to the probability of an insuree’s activities causing a loss. 
Proposing that the insurance industry actively manage 
climate change risks by requiring insurees to behave in a less 
risky fashion is not a radical proposal for the industry.  As one 
author suggests, the quiet power of insurers over their insured 
parties is equivalent to a “material constitution . . . that operates 
through routine, mundane transactions that nevertheless define 
the contours of individual and social responsibility.”62  In the past, 
to reduce exposure to losses, the insurance industry has 
frequently mandated system-wide implementation of technologies 
that mitigate losses.  For example, fire insurers have required 
that their insured parties install fire alarms not just to protect 
the insures property but also to protect other buildings in the 
community whose owners might be able to file a third-party claim 
against the insurer.  Even where a given technology is not 
required, insurance companies offer incentives for adopting 
certain technology.  For example, preferential auto insurance 
rates are given to vehicle owners who drive cars with anti-lock 
braking systems and other safety features. 
While major industry players have conceded that their 
greenhouse gas emissions must be managed, these players want 
to be able to set their own schedule for reductions.  If the 
insurance industry were to become substantially involved in 
underwriting the climate change catastrophe risks posed by 
certain major emitters, then emitters would find themselves 
having to answer to the risk tolerances of insurers rather than 
simply the annual profit demands of their boardroom.  The 
climate risks associated with certain industry behaviors would be 
scrutinized and evaluated not only through the public lens of 
environmental agencies and environmental activism groups, but 
more importantly, through the risk tolerance of private insurers. 
As long as insurers seek to responsibly manage their risk 
portfolios, any requirement for mandatory insurance from major 
 
 61. Howard C. Kunreuther, & Paul K. Freeman, Insurability, Environmental 
Risks, and the Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 302, 305 
(Anthony Heyes, ed. 2001). 
 62. T. Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 291 
(1996). 
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greenhouse gas emitters should gradually reduce national climate 
change emissions as insurers demand certain mitigation efforts 
on the part of their insurees.  If fully implemented, a mandatory 
insurance scheme should lead to some combination of direct 
mitigation by large greenhouse gas emitters or indirect emission 
mitigation as the goods or services of large greenhouse gas 
emitters become more expensive and consumers purchase less, 
conserve more, or seek less-polluting alternatives. 
2.  Earthquake Insurance as a Model for Developing 
Climate Change Insurance Products 
While scientists are well informed about what happens 
during and after an earthquake, the tools to forecast earthquakes 
remain underdeveloped.  While there are substantial challenges 
with obtaining information about when an earthquake will 
happen, there are ample models about what losses are likely in 
the event of a certain magnitude earthquake.  So while insurers 
do not know when to expect a given magnitude earthquake, they 
can make predictions about how much damage a given magnitude 
earthquake would cost.  While wary of insuring for earthquakes 
because of the uncertainties of timing, private insurers have 
offered and continue to offer certain levels of earthquake 
insurance.  A review of earthquake insurance products may 
provide some insights about the role of insurance in climate 
change. 
Like climate change, the modeling of earthquakes is based on 
“dubious assumptions and subjective criteria related to what 
might happen over the next several hundred years.”63  What data 
does exist on historic earthquakes is limited.  Yet private insurers 
have not completely shied away from offering insurance products 
to cover against long-term geological risks.  They have instead 
simply relied on more creative and imaginative analytical 
techniques, collected more evidence including independent 
geological surveys, and then issued policies on the basis of certain 
educated assumptions about geological risk. 
Insurance companies view earthquakes from the point of 
view of not “if” but “when.”  With the emphasis placed on “when,” 
 
 63. ERICSON & DOYLE, supra note 58, at 34. 
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the companies consider their contribution to be one of amassing 
capital that will be made available to protect the monetary value 
of assets “when” there is a disaster.  Where earthquake insurance 
is offered as part of property and casualty insurance packages, 
some nationwide insurers provide affordable premiums by 
packaging the earthquake coverage as a non-negotiable part of 
the policy regardless of the actual risk of earthquakes.64  This 
means that property owners in areas where there is no danger of 
earthquake subsidize future payouts for earthquake losses. 
In order to create somewhat affordable premiums with a 
broad enough market for risk pooling, the insurers currently rely 
on contributions from both the government and insured parties.  
Governments can provide some security and incentive for 
insurers who offer earthquake insurance by either reinsuring 
certain high-level risk or by offering capital reserve-building tax 
benefits to insurers including relief from paying income tax on 
earthquake insurance premium income.65 
Like other kinds of insurance for “uninsurable” risks, 
earthquake insurance has its own challenges.  One of the greatest 
challenges is to convince parties to purchase insurance since 
earthquakes are improbable risks.  The second challenge is to 
ensure that insurers are actually setting premiums aside from its 
general pool into an earthquake reserve pool.66  The general 
perception in the industry is that earthquakes are distant 
dangers that do not require short-term financial planning.  The 
final challenge is making sure that the reinsurance on 
earthquake risks does not result in a “house of cards” effect if one 
reinsurer was to collapse because it has assumed too much risk 
from irresponsible underwriters.67 
The challenges faced by earthquake insurers are informative 
for would-be insurers of climate change.  Both events involve a 
high magnitude of damages with poor levels of predictability.  
While no one knows when or how likely it is that key ice shelves 
will melt or Category IV storms will hit the coasts, existing 
earthquake insurance schemes suggest that a viable climate 
 
 64. Id. at 191. 
 65. Id. at 208. 
 66. Id. at 199. 
 67. Id. at 200. 
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change insurance scheme may require some form of government 
reinsurance or guarantee, may need to be both mandatory and 
risk-differentiating to ensure adequate capitalization, and may 
require from its insured parties changes in business practices to 
reduce risks. Earthquake insurance is mandatory in New 
Zealand, Taiwan, Turkey, and Iceland. 
3.  Mandatory vs. Voluntary Insurance 
One of the keys allowing for proper capitalization for 
earthquake insurance is mandatory participation in an insurance 
scheme.  For a climate change catastrophe insurance product to 
serve a meaningful mitigation role, it will need to be mandated 
for major greenhouse gas emitters.  There are various economic, 
political, and scientific approaches to defining a “major” 
greenhouse gas emitter.  For the purposes of this proposal for 
insurance, a major greenhouse gas emitter will be any industrial 
plant that emits 25,000 tons of greenhouse gases a year as well as 
any industry whose business activities cumulatively contribute 
25,000 tons of greenhouse gases a year.  This number was chosen 
based on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s proposal to 
require polluters releasing 25,000 tons of greenhouse gases a year 
to implement best available technology whenever an existing 
facility is changed or a new facility is built.68 
The most important reason for mandating catastrophe risk 
insurance is to compel industry actors to take action under the 
supervision of the profit motivated insurance industry.  
Industries have understandably taken few steps to mitigate their 
emissions since there remains uncertainty about what sort of 
carbon market will emerge or what regulatory expectations 
companies must meet.  In some respects, the current regulatory 
paralysis may be encouraging companies to continue “business as 
usual” practices in hopes of future benefits under an unknown 
trading scheme.  Even though some companies have participated 
in carbon footprinting through projects such as the Carbon 
Disclosure Project,69 coal powered electricity plants continue to go 
 
 68. Dina Cappiello, EPA to Crack Down on Greenhouse Gas Emitters, S.F. 
CHRON., Oct. 1, 2009. 
 69. Carbon Disclosure Project, http://www.cdproject.net (last visited Aug. 18, 
2010). 
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on-line in countries such as the U.S. with 77 plants under 
construction, permitted, or being developed as of January 2010.70  
Without a regulatory incentive such as mandatory insurance to 
change current behavior, history suggests that industries are 
unlikely to adopt greener production.  Even though climate 
change concerns have been debated since the 1990s, it has taken 
almost two decades to get research and development financing 
into areas such as cleaner emissions in greenhouse gas intensive 
sectors such as the heavy trucking industry71 whose overall 
greenhouse gas emissions have grown 76% since 1990. 72 
There are numerous other practical reasons for mandating 
insurance.  First, mandating the insurance should provide some 
safeguard against insurer insolvency in the face of a catastrophic 
disaster.  If the product was completely voluntary, the burden 
would be on the insurance industry to market the product by 
persuading companies that the cost-benefit analysis weigh in 
favor of paying an insurance premium now rather than facing the 
costs of future unknown liability. 
Given the current line of cases seeking liability against 
greenhouse gas producers, the industry may be willing to gamble 
that plaintiffs will not be able to definitively prove causation 
thereby reducing industries exposure to payments for climate 
change damages.  In the earliest climate change liability cases, 
plaintiffs argued that unabated emission of greenhouse gases by 
corporations were the equivalent of public nuisances.  Trial courts 
rejected this line of reasoning because the plaintiffs were seeking 
resolution of a “political question” by the courts.73  In a later case 
Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, plaintiffs 
sued for the costs of relocating their village due to historically 
 
 70. Erik Shuster, Tracking New Coal-Fired Power Plants, NATIONAL ENERGY 
TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, Jan 8, 2010, http://www.netl.doe.gov/coal/refshelf/ 
ncp.pdf. 
 71. Peterbuilt News & Events, Jan. 12, 2010 U.S. Department of Energy 
Awards $39 million in Support of the Supertruck Program, 
http://www.peterbilt.com/newsdetails.aspx?id=275 (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
 72. U.S. DOT, Transportation & Climate Change Clearinghouse, 
Transportation GHG Emissions and Trends: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Transportation and Mobile Sources, by Vehicle Type, 
http://climate.dot.gov/ghg-inventories-forcasts/national/us-inventory-structure. 
html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
 73. People v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, 
at *16 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2007). 
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unprecedented storm surges created by the early melting of Arctic 
ice sheets.  Plaintiffs argued that in addition to creating a public 
nuisance certain oil companies should be held responsible for 
conspiring to cover up the impacts of their activities on climate 
and be required to compensate plaintiffs on a market-share 
basis.74  Relying on the factors from the seminal political question 
case Baker v. Carr,75 the judge dismissed the plaintiff’s case in 
Kivalina by finding that the pleadings raised a non-justiciable 
political question.  Even though the Second Circuit recently 
decided in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co,.76  that the 
political question doctrine did not bar nuisance claims against 
major greenhouse gas emitters, the California District Court 
refused to follow suit and commented that, “[t]his court is not so 
sanguine.  While such principles may provide sufficient guidance 
in some novel cases, this is not one of them.”77 
With the future of civil liability so uncertain, industry has no 
incentive to change “business as usual” and certainly no incentive 
to purchase voluntary climate change insurance.  The only 
possible incentive to purchase voluntary insurance would be if the 
government guaranteed some cap on industries’ exposure to 
future liability suits.  The failure of civil liability suits to create 
any traction to promote greenhouse gas mitigation efforts 
suggests a second reason for mandating climate change 
catastrophe insurance.  No voluntary insurance scheme would 
cover in any meaningful fashion the government costs associated 
with responding to an extreme weather climate disaster.  If there 
are only a few companies participating voluntarily in the scheme, 
the insurance will be unable to spread the risk across the 
population of insured parties and without the law of large 
numbers operating, any insurance claims would result at best in 
only token payouts. 
A final reason for mandating insurance is to establish for the 
business community that climate change is a manmade disaster 
 
 74. Complaint at 2, Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 
F.Supp2d 863 (N.D. Cal Feb. 26, 2008) (No. 08-01138); Native Vill. Of Kivalina 
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp2d 863 (N.D. Cal 2009) (granting the motion to 
dismiss the complaint). 
 75. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 76. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 77. Kivalina, 663 F.Supp2d at 875. 
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and that the long-term solutions to advert climate change are 
human solutions.  Legal precedent suggests that even though the 
state has traditionally shouldered the costs associated with “act 
of God” natural disasters, the community expects private insurers 
to pay for damages associated with manmade disasters.78  Even 
with the general scientific and policymaking consensus that 
climate change has been caused by anthropogenic sources, 
corporations continue to introduce technologies that fly in the 
face of climate change being any sort of short-term corporate 
policy concern.79  When premiums are accurately set, mandatory 
insurance is an effective tool for limiting the externalization of 
the social and environmental costs of business practices. 
Legislating for mandatory insurance products will be 
controversial.  It may even be more controversial among 
insurance companies than among insurees.  Efforts in February 
2009 to require insurers to offer a climate change product such as 
pay-as-you-drive insurance in order to incentivize driving less 
were met with resistance from the insurance industry.  David 
Snyder, a vice president with the American Insurance 
Association, claims that when the legislature creates mandatory 
policies it puts insurers in a “regulatory straitjacket.”80 
Yet without mandating a nationwide policy, there will be 
neither industry wide changes leading to meaningful reductions 
in emissions nor adequate capitalization for any insurance 
product protecting against catastrophic climate change damages.   
Insurance customers seeking coverage under a voluntary product 
 
 78. See, e.g., Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide,  International Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Nov. 29, 1969) 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970); 
Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the 
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects 
of Industrial Accidents, available at http://www.unece.org/env/civil-liability/ 
documents/protocol_e.pdf. 
 79. Mike Robinson, Vice President, Environment, Energy, and Safety Policy, 
GM (Oct. 29, 2009) (stating in a corporate responsibility blog: “we will take 
issues like climate change head on”); but see Cadillac.com, 
http://www.cadillac.com/dts/features-specs/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) (noting 
that GM continues to offer in 2010 its new “full-size” 4000 pound Cadillac DTS 
which gets 15 mpg in the city). 
 80. Evan Lehmann, Regulators Vote to Make Industry Act on Climate 
Change, CLIMATEWIRE, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire 
/2009/02/25/archive/6?terms=insurance. 
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who refuse to make the changes requested by an insurance 
company as part of an insurers’ risk assessment would have the 
option to simply not insure.  Some players in the insurance 
industry seem to favor regulation.  In testimony before the Select 
Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, Frank 
Nutter of the American Reinsurance Association commented that 
the insurance industry is not responsible for “bearing the cost of 
climate change without a concomitant commitment on the part of 
society to pursue a mitigation strategy—addressing the causes 
and consequences of climate change.”81 
Government regulations provide the nationwide commitment 
that some players in the insurance markets seem to be waiting 
for before acting.  A regulatory scheme that requires mandatory 
private catastrophe risk insurance makes sense for the federal 
and state governments as they seek to adequately capitalize 
disaster relief compensation programs and post-disaster 
infrastructure revitalization programs.  Mandatory insurance 
provides governments with a proven market mechanism that can 
indirectly manage existing and future risks in a dynamically 
changing environmental and business climate. 
4.  Logistics of Implementing Private Climate Change 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance 
The impetus for proposing mandatory climate change 
catastrophe insurance to cover the costs generally associated with 
government run catastrophic relief is to provide an indirect 
incentive for major greenhouse gas emitting corporations to make 
systemic greenhouse gas reducing changes in their operations.  If 
enough major emitters make systemic changes then there should 
be some measurable mitigation effect.  In contrast to individuals 
who are constrained in large part by what the market makes 
available to them, corporate entities have the capacity on a large 
and influential scale to reinvent their products and services to 
 
 81. FRANKLIN NUTTER, REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING: PART I-INSURANCE 7 (2007), available at 
http://www.globalwarming.house.gov/tools/assets/files/0087.pdf. 
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meet not only their economic bottom line but also a broader 
environmental bottom line.82 
Bearing in mind that insurance companies deplore 
“regulatory straitjackets”, this section explores how private 
insurance might operate if governments issued a broad regulation 
requiring all major greenhouse gas emitters83 under their 
jurisdiction to carry insurance to cover climate change 
catastrophe damages.  In selecting which set of major greenhouse 
gas emitters to regulate, the focus should be on which emitters 
are most likely to continue to have a sizable cumulative impact on 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.  The amount of 
required insurance coverage by an industry would be based on 
estimated costs of future climate change disaster relief multiplied 
by what percentage each emitter contributes to the national 
green house gas inventory. 
There are no existing products on the market that would 
protect the public’s interest in disaster relief or infrastructure.  
The insurance products on the market that are not targeted 
specifically at climate change risks may not cover climate change 
disaster.  Insurers may refuse to pay claims where a policy 
contains pollution exclusion and where greenhouse gases are 
accepted as pollution.84  Many insurance policies deny coverage 
 
 82. United Nations, Global Compact, The Global Compact and the United 
Nations Environment Programme, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Participants 
AndStakeholders/un_agencies/un_environment_programme.html (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2010) (describing UNEP’s “triple bottom line” work with private sector 
to improve environmental sustainability). 
 83. These numbers are based on EPA’s proposal to regulate retrofits and new 
plants from industries emitting 25,000 tons of greenhouse gas or more. 
According to EPA plants emitting 25,000 tons of greenhouse gas or more account 
for 70% of the carbon dioxide in the United States. See John Broder, EPA Moves 
to Curtail Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Sept. 30, 2009, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/science/ earth/01epa.html. In order to be 
more inclusive, the term “major greenhouse gas emitters” for mandatory 
insurance coverage might be defined by regulators to include plants emitting at 
least 25,000 tons of greenhouse gas or all industries who contribute through 
their activities or products 25,000 tons of greenhouse gas. 
 84. Press Release, U.S. EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, Greenhouse Gases 
Threaten Public Health and the Environment/Science overwhelmingly shows 
greenhouse gas concentrations at unprecedented levels due to human activity 
(Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/7eb 
df4d0b217978b852573590040443a/08d11a451131bca585257685005bf252!OpenD
ocument (announcing that the current concentrations of greenhouse gas in the 
atmosphere represent a pollution problem). 
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where a given occurrence leading to loss is found by the court to 
have been intended by the corporation.  Arguably, industries such 
as energy companies who continue to release greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere in spite of evidence that they are 
contributing to the emerging impacts of climate change, intend to 
cause long-term losses. 
i.  Who would be required to carry coverage and how 
much coverage? 
While no single corporate entity may have a sizable 
greenhouse gas footprint in proportion to the atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations, certain industry sectors are 
having disproportionate cumulative impacts including the 
producers of electricity, iron and steel, aluminum, oil, cement, 
lime, and pulp and paper.85  A State could decide who is a major 
emitter for purposes of its insurance regulations either based on 
tons of carbon or carbon equivalent emitted annually (raw 
quantification approach) or on the percentage of carbon emitted 
annually in comparison to other industries (proportionality 
approach).  A number of tools exist which would provide methods 
for setting a baseline for identifying who qualifies as a “major” 
emitter within a given greenhouse gas intensive sector.  For 
example, the Carbon Monitoring for Action group provides 
databases of the carbon dioxide emitted by various power 
companies which might be used to set a numerical baseline to 
quantify which corporate entities in the electricity sector would 
be required to carry insurance coverage as “major greenhouse gas 
emitters”.86 
How much insurance each party is required to carry would be 
the subject of negotiation between the insurance industry and 
government regulators.  The private insurance industry cannot 
viably provide climate change catastrophe insurance without 
capping liability for a given event.  What caps would be set would 
depend on what the insurers and the government agree represent 
 
 85. Jake Schmidt, Nate Helme, Jin Lee, & Mark Houdashelt, Sector Based 
Approach to the Post-2012 Climate Change Policy Archatecture, 8 CLIMATE 
POLICY 494, 498 (2008). 
 86. CARMA, Carbon Monitoring for Action, http://carma.org/ (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2010). 
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a fair economic analysis of low-probability, high-damage climate 
catastrophes. 
ii.  How would premiums be calculated? 
Insurers could calculate initial general premium sums based 
on the corporate sector’s overall contribution to national 
emissions and expected financial losses resulting from predicted 
climate change catastrophe such as an anomalous heat wave, 
storm surge, ice storm or a series of class three plus hurricanes.  
Individual premiums would be based on a risk-specific factor for 
each insured party.  The individual risk-specific factor might be 
calculated based on a raw quantification approach (e.g. for 
insurance premium purposes, if carbon is valued at X per unit, an 
entity would pay a risk-specific premium for volume emitted 
multiplied by X), a proportionality approach (e.g. emitting 3% of 
the corporate sector’s carbon contribution would result in a 
premium covering 3% of the expected damages assigned to the 
corporate sector), or some combination of the two.  Using any of 
these approaches to calculate premiums should provide incentives 
to emission producing companies to focus either individually on 
cutting emissions or collectively within a sector to reducing a 
given sector’s emission contribution.  Currently, the consumption 
of electricity is responsible for 39.5% of the anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide emissions with over 80% of these emissions coming from 
coal-fired power plants.87  Any reduction in the corporate sector 
percentage could, if a proportionality approach is used, translate 
into reduced premiums for each company in the sector. 
In order to rely on historical patterns of usage and realizing 
that it takes time for corporations to make behavioral changes, 
initial premiums could be based on the operation and production 
activities of an industrial entity over a 5 to 10 year period prior to 
the implementation of the insurance.  To set a baseline for an 
insured parties share in the carbon economy, insurance agencies 
might undertake audits of direct emissions or some combination 
of direct and indirect emissions for each party.  In subsequent 
years, insured parties would be required to submit updated third-
party greenhouse gas reports calculated based on parameters 
 
 87. U.S. Power Plant Carbon Emissions Zoom in 2007, ENVTL. NEWS SERVICE, 
Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2008/2008-03-18-04.asp. 
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established by the initial insurance audits.  Subsequent 
premiums would depend on whether a company had increased or 
decreased its carbon share in comparison to both its initial 
baseline and to other national emission sectors.  Calculating the 
premium accurately and fairly is crucial in order to provide 
tangible incentives for individual companies to cut their 
emissions while also continuing to hold large-scale polluters 
responsible for the harms caused by their ongoing activities. 
Even leaving aside the uncertainties of climate science, 
insurers, industry, and government environmental regulators are 
likely to dispute what is appropriately within the gamut of an 
audit designed to set a baseline and how to measure industry 
performance against the baseline.  For a company such as retail 
leviathan Wal-Mart, should they be held responsible only for the 
emissions associated with operating their chain of stores in the 
U.S. e.g. shipping in Wal-mart owned trucks and operating 
storefronts?  Or should they also be held accountable for the 
emissions of their suppliers in China who are providing goods 
specifically to the U.S. market or the transport emissions by 
third-party transpacific shippers who are contracted by Wal-mart 
to move goods to the U.S. market?  The legislature would need to 
make final decisions regarding which types of emissions would be 
covered by baseline audits.  From a mitigation perspective, both 
direct and indirect emissions associated with a product or service 
should be included so as to provide a realistic footprint of a given 
entities greenhouse gas intensive activities. 
From the perspective of simply reducing emissions, overlap 
between carbon share audits might spur multiple actors into 
action to mitigate the impact of their goods or services.  Since 
mandatory insurance would depend on national legislation and 
States may be able to effectively regulate activities of a 
multinational in another State, it would be prudent from the 
perspective of the State and the private insurers participating in 
the mandatory insurance scheme to be as inclusive as possible in 
defining the parameters of direct emissions.  This would ensure 
that companies’ insurance premiums and amount of coverage 
reflect the reality of a carbon intensive global supply chain.  In 
the case of a multinational such as Wal-Mart, if the emissions 
audit is restricted to its activities in the U.S., it may have a 
relatively modest greenhouse gas footprint in comparison to other 
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similarly sized industrial actors.  But, when the focus is 
broadened to include all of its manufacturing and shipping 
activities across the world, the footprint becomes noticeably 
larger. From a pure carbon mitigation perspective and the 
concept that a polluter must pay for the consequences of its 
business decisions, it makes sense to include the manufacturing 
and shipping activities as part of Wal-Mart’s corporate footprint 
because the strategy of using certain overseas suppliers and 
third-party shippers contributes to Wal-Mart’s overall profit base 
in the U.S.. 
iii.  Who could bring claims? 
The only claimants under the proposed insurance would be 
the state, federal, and municipal government agencies who are 
responders in the case of a catastrophe, climate change induced 
or otherwise.  These government agencies are in the best position 
to understand how much a given catastrophe costs a community 
and would have the resources to pursue and document the losses 
needed to file a third-party claim.  The catastrophe risk insurers 
would make single payments to the government agencies that 
would either be reimbursals for first response emergency work 
that the government agencies had done in response to a 
catastrophe such as hazard mitigation and debris removal or for 
post-disaster rehabilitation payments to restore and adapt 
damaged public infrastructure such as road systems, public 
buildings, bridges, public utilities, and parks.  In the case of post-
disaster rehabilitation payments, the insurance company would 
send someone to document the extent of the losses and whether a 
structure could be repaired or would need to be rebuilt. 
iv.  What claims may be brought? 
The proposed insurance would cover claims for prospective 
disaster relief expenses.  Claims could not be made for damages 
alleged to be from before the policy was issued.  This approach 
simplifies one of the recurring debates about extending climate 
change responsibility retroactively to cover the actions of historic 
emitters and avoids employing insurance as a form of reparation.  
Daniel Farber observes that while a reparation model of 
compensation has a certain moral appeal, such a model relies on 
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connecting a specific damage to a specific wrongdoer and then 
somehow assigning responsibility through an indeterminate 
intergenerational approach.88  While the reparation approach 
satisfies the equity concerns of making the polluter pay, it raises 
technical problems with attributing historical pollution since 
many previous polluters have ceased to exist and the pre-1990 
amount of emissions has been dwarfed by current emissions.89  A 
reparation approach also raises issues of whether we can hold 
parties accountable when there was conflicting knowledge and 
awareness of the long-term consequences of greenhouse gas 
emitting activities. 
v.  Relationship to other insurance products 
The mandatory insurance proposed by this paper would not 
replace existing products but would provide another layer of 
insurance for existing disaster relief insurance products. 
Currently, there is an emerging market for state and municipal 
property insurance products to protect states who have 
experienced disaster losses and who might need to rely in the 
future on public assistance for disaster rehabilitation.  In order to 
receive public assistance from FEMA, entities that have already 
received historic payments for disaster losses must prove 
insurance coverage “for the type of hazard that caused the 
damage” in order to remain eligible for public funds.90 
vi.  On what basis will claims be paid? 
This paper proposes the use of an index-based approach for 
triggering payments of insurance claims.  This approach avoids 
problems of causation that are inherent in pursuing other 
liability theories such as nuisance.  In the context of climate 
change liability, much has been written on the difficulty of 
 
 88. Daniel Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1634 (2007). 
 89. Myles Allen, Liability for Climate Change, 421 NATURE 892 (2003) 
(scientists suggest that two-thirds of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere by 
the 2020s will have been emitted post-1990). 
 90. FEMA, Insurance Considerations for Applicants: Disaster Assistance 
Fact Sheet No. 9580.3 (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.fema.gov 
/government/grant/pa/9580_3.shtm. 
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causation and attribution.91  How can one reasonably trace a 
particular weather event to a particular set of greenhouse gases 
emitted by an identifiable defendant? Physicist Myles Allen 
proposes one potential methodology for attributing damage to 
anthropogenically caused climate change.  He argues that even 
though we cannot know with certainty how greenhouse gas 
emissions alter the risks associated with events such as flooding, 
it may be able to work out a “mean likelihood-weighted liability” 
through averaging over all the possibilities.92  If Allen is correct 
about this, we can then calculate what percentage of a given 
event is attributable to climate change factors.  If it is possible to 
assign a climate change attribution rate to any given event, then 
all that is needed to assign costs for damages in a nationally 
equitably way is the collective carbon share of all insured parties 
and the national carbon share for each insured party at the time 
of an event covered by the insurance policy. 
But Allen’s probability and percentage approach could prove 
very complicated and would leave ample space for interminable 
legal and scientific wrangling about whether an event was 
actually caused by anthropogenic climate change.  Instead, 
insurers could decide in concert with independent climate 
experts, who are not employed by the government, what 
measurable environmental triggers should result in the 
government’s ability to file a claim.  For example, heat waves of a 
certain temperature and duration in a particular location that 
result in damages and a government disaster response might 
trigger a claim.  Or windstorms of a certain velocity that result in 
damages and a government disaster response might trigger a 
claim.  This approach would enhance the objectivity of the claim 
process and would lend a degree of predictability to both paying 
damages and recovering damages under the insurance policy. 
The use of triggers for insurance products is already common 
for certain types of index insurance such as weather based crop 
insurance schemes.  These products look at one or more 
 
 91. Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, 
Insurability Of Large- Scale Disasters, And The Emerging Liability Challenge, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2007); Roda Verheyen , CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); David A. Grossman, Warming up to a not so radical 
idea: Tort-based climate change litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003). 
 92. Allen, supra note 89, at 891. 
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measurable parameters such as temperature or precipitation 
which is considered responsible for most crop losses.  In the case 
of these products, insurers give payouts even where there is no 
damage claimed.  Development organizations such as the World 
Bank are currently popularizing index-based insurance to help 
small-scale farmers in Malawi, India, and Thailand cope with 
droughts and floods attributable to severe weather.93  Some of the 
strengths of trigger-based insurance products over other 
insurance products are the transparency of the trigger-based 
system, the objectivity and relative speed of the claims process, 
and the ability of insurers to more accurately calculate their 
losses when a trigger event occurs. 
Even though claims payments on the part of the insurer for 
an index insurance product would simply be an objective exercise, 
setting what parameters would trigger the insurance would be a 
highly subjective exercise given what is known and not known 
about attribution and climate change.  Creating reasonable 
climate change attribution triggers requires a careful refinement 
of climate models coupled with eventual judgment calls by 
scientists and policymakers.  Once a trigger is set, the trigger-
based insurance approach will avoid a constant battle of experts 
over each claim.  If the standards to set triggers are easily 
verifiable, whether a given trigger has been activated should be 
easily ascertainable for government claimants.  Without 
requiring any formal finding by an expert or a judiciary, the 
events that trigger insurance claims would be considered, for 
purposes of insurance payouts, climate change attributable 
events. 
Setting appropriate triggers is likely to be primarily a 
scientific endeavor coupled with an economic judgment call.  
Arguably the insurance industry could set triggers that are 
unreasonably high such as 10-day heat waves of 100 plus in 
Anchorage, Alaska.  While setting the triggers at this level would 
result in low premiums, which may be favored by the insured 
companies, it would provide no financial incentive for 
undertaking any short or long-term emission mitigation or other 
loss prevention measures.  At the other extreme, setting the 
 
 93. Xavier Gine, The World Bank, The Promise of Index Insurance, THE 
WORLD BANK (Mar. 2009), http://go.worldbank.org/FN5UCVPJG0. 
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triggers too low would potentially result in multiple payments by 
insurers, exorbitantly high premiums, and a higher likelihood of 
insolvency on the part of both insurers and insured companies.  
Some balance would be necessary if insurance is to serve any role 
in reducing emissions and ensuring that the polluter pays some of 
the expenses associated with government disaster response 
through their required insurance payments. 
One possible, albeit controversial, trigger for climate change 
index insurance could be parts per million of carbon or carbon 
equivalents in the atmosphere.  How much carbon is too much is 
heavily disputed.  Some groups argue that we have passed the 
last “safe” level of 350 ppm.  Others suggest that the point of no 
return is 450 ppm.94  Perhaps regulators in cooperation with 
insurance companies could set a trigger somewhere in between 
and use this number as a basis for calculating insurance risk and 
appropriate premiums. 
vii.  Collecting on claims 
How would the government be able to collect disaster 
payments to reimburse for government expenses?  For 
illustration purposes, take the following hypothetical case.  A 
heat wave hits New York with temperatures in excess of 115 
degrees Fahrenheit over the course of five days.  It results in the 
city of New York declaring a disaster and delivering $10,000,000 
dollars of services.  According to the insurance policy, heat waves 
of greater than 105 degrees in the New York metropolitan area 
that last for more than two days and that result in government 
responses would trigger claims.  Once the government 
demonstrates that the trigger elements in the policy have 
occurred, the insurer would pay the claim for losses and damages 
attributed to the trigger elements, such as costs of acquiring 
water from another water district or the costs of bringing in 
additional emergency medical services. 
Since not all of the emissions responsible for the temperature 
spike would be the responsibility of major greenhouse gas 
emitters who are under the jurisdiction of the insurance scheme, 
 
 94. Green, A Blog About Energy & the Environment, N. Y. TIMES, The 
Climate Change Numbers Game, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/ 
carbon-concentrations-already-too-much/ (June 4, 2009, 11:32 EST). 
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the insured parties would only be responsible for some proportion 
of the losses.  In the heatwave hypothetical, if 80% of the New 
York heat wave triggering emissions were assigned to the major 
greenhouse gas emitters, all insurees would be collectively 
responsible for $8,000,000. 
Because each insuree would only be held accountable for a 
proportional amount of the damages associated with a particular 
event, the proportion of damages collected would depend on the 
emissions record of each insured party.  If power company A has 
made a concerted effort to reduce its emissions by using 
alternative less polluting fuels and power company B has 
continued to use coal-generation power plant technology, the 
contribution from power company B to climate disaster damages 
would be substantially more than power company A.  As 
premiums climb for late-adopters of climate friendly practices, 
the insurance market will need to demand either a schedule of 
emission reductions or larger premiums to cover insurers’ risks.  
As premiums grow larger and more costs are passed on to 
consumers, large recalcitrant greenhouse gas emitters may 
become less competitive as consumers seek alternative products 
and services. 
viii. Reinsurance 
The viability of a mandatory catastrophe risk insurance 
product depends in part on the availability of reinsurance 
markets to insure the risk portfolios of insurance companies.   
Like other insurance products, this proposed product would need 
to have some upper limit on payouts to protect private insurance 
and reinsurance companies from bankruptcy.  Once the policy 
limit for a particular event is exceeded, the government would, as 
in the case of Japanese earthquake insurance, be the ultimate 
social reinsurer by paying for the bulk of certain extraordinary 
claims. 
5.   Climate change equity and the advantages and 
disadvantages of using mandatory insurance as a 
mitigation strategy 
The intent behind the proposed third-party climate change 
catastrophe insurance product is two fold: recoup some amount of 
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government costs for disaster relief in the case of a low 
probability high damage disaster, and provide financial 
incentives for industries to change current business practices so 
as to reduce the future probabilities of climate related disasters. 
The success of this type of insurance scheme to promote 
climate change mitigation depends on insurers accurately setting 
base premiums that would cover their projected losses in the 
event of a climate change catastrophe.  If the insurance 
premiums become simply another minor business expense, it will 
have little influence on promoting behaviors that will result in 
measurable emission reductions and may expose insurers to 
insolvency in the case of a claim that cannot be paid out of the 
collected premiums. 
In addition to addressing the distributive justice issue of who 
should pay for long-term damage, the catastrophe risk insurance 
policies have the potential to also be used to address larger equity 
issues between currently industrialized states and states that 
have neither benefited from nor contributed to the carbon 
economy.  Depending on how it structures its regulations, a 
government may be able to seek reimbursals from industries for 
government payments into global insurance pools for states with 
low adaptive capacity, such as the Pacific Island states or 
Bangladesh, or to global climate funds such as the $3.5 billion of 
funds pledged at the 2009 Copenhagen conference to prevent 
tropical forest destruction and degradation.95  This would not only 
result in an implementation of the polluter pays principle 
discussed below but would also satisfy the goals of distributive 
justice by transferring wealth to those communities where the 
global carbon economy has unfairly exposed individuals to 
human-created conditions of vulnerability. 
The advantage of creating a new insurance product is that it 
provides a fast-track approach for greenhouse gas mitigation with 
key roles for non-political, business-oriented agents to ensure 
compliance with insurer-insuree negotiated mitigation targets.  
In fact, before such a mandatory insurance system would go into 
effect, insurance companies, seeking to manage their potential 
 
 95. Juliet Ellperin, Hope and Funding for Saving Forests Around the World, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/12/19/AR2009121902262.html?hpid=topnews#. 
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losses, might demand easy-to-implement risk loss measures from 
their insured parties (e.g. energy efficiency measures or 
investments in emission reducing production practices).  In order 
to reduce initial premiums, companies may voluntarily undertake 
emission reduction measures before requesting a coverage policy. 
This mandatory insurance proposal avoids the problems 
faced in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez disaster.  The U.S. 
endeavored to make Exxon internalize the costs of its dangerous 
activities by requiring Exxon to pay for the cleanup and 
restoration of the environment.  The result was a “dilatory and 
inadequate response.”96  Here the Valdez problem is avoided 
because the large carbon emitters internalize the future costs of 
delivering emergency services before a potential disaster through 
the payment of annual premiums. 
Because certain corporate entities are being targeted for 
participation in the program, certain equal protection issues 
emerge.  Any mandatory insurance system has to have 
parameters whereby some companies are held financially 
accountable while others are spared.  In an ideal world of 
textbook equity, all corporate entities regardless of quantity of 
emissions, would be required to undertake climate-proofing of 
their activities and to indemnify the government in the event of a 
climate change induced catastrophe.  This approach is, however, 
not feasible since the transaction costs associated with 
establishing a nationwide comprehensive program would be far 
greater than the benefits accrued from requiring a single 
restaurant owner to reduce deliveries or a small business 
consultant to eliminate all travel. 
In weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the 
proposed insurance system, two sets of questions emerge.  The 
first set of questions address industry-to-industry relations.  Will 
implementation of this insurance policy cause one set of 
industries to ultimately bear the responsibility for climate change 
that should be more broadly shared by other industries?  For 
example, should the electricity industry have to bear the largest 
burden because its direct products and service are greenhouse gas 
intensive while other companies such as car manufacturers are 
 
 96. PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 93 (2002). 
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only being held accountable for their direct production emissions 
and not for the indirect emissions resulting from consumers? 
Should car companies be held accountable for some additional 
share of emissions because they have demonstrated the capacity 
to produce low-emission vehicles and yet continue to manufacture 
fossil fuel driven vehicles to meet what they perceive as consumer 
demand? 
The second set of questions addresses the relationship 
between industry and consumers.  Where a business is faced with 
new regulations and expenses, it frequently passes some portion 
of the costs onto consumers.  In the context of climate change 
damages, it is arguably fair that automobile drivers, energy 
users, airline passengers, and other consumers of greenhouse gas-
intensive products and services pay for the privileges of 
participating in the carbon economy.  After all, as discussed 
above, the polluter should pay for harm caused by their choice of 
activities.  But is it fair to allow corporations to pass on all of 
their costs to consumers when consumers have little to no 
influence over the design of the cars available on the market? 
How can our legal system truly hold a corporate actor responsible 
as a polluter without triggering a ripple effect of responsibility 
that ultimately ends up in consumers funding a company’s 
expenses through the future price of goods and services? 
These are the dilemmas that will surface when trying to 
define specific rules for an insurance approach that combines 
carbon mitigation with long-term accountability.  The focus on 
the relationship between climate change and insurance should be 
on these sorts of questions rather than the currently debated 
question of whether climate change as a phenomenon is 
insurable.  Requiring mandatory catastrophe risk insurance for 
high emitters is not a silver bullet solution.  Yet requiring 
companies to take a hard look at their emissions in the context of 
risk management for disaster relief may serve as an important 
step in the stimulation of rapid mitigation efforts on the part of 
major emitters. 
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PART TWO:  
MANDATORY INSURANCE AS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
ASPECTS OF THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE 
This second part of the paper argues that the mandatory 
insurance scheme described above promotes a viable approach to 
implementing the Polluter Pays Principle as an equity concept 
that satisfies the goals of both corrective justice and distributive 
justice. Insurance explicitly allocates responsibility. 
The polluter pays principle (PPP) seems rudimentary in 
concept. Parties are held accountable to compensate injured 
parties for the costs of the damage that they have caused or are 
likely to cause given the hazardous nature of a particular activity. 
In practice, PPP remains under-implemented especially for 
problems with a global reach.  One reason for the inequitable 
implementation of the principle is the split nature of the concept. 
In legal debates, PPP is cited as both a general principle of equity 
as well as a principle of economic efficiency.97  This dual nature of 
PPP has in practice led to it being considered primarily as an 
efficiency principle and only secondarily as an aspirational legal 
principle. 
Because its first articulation as a principle was at the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
as a methodology for internalizing costs of pollution abatement, 
PPP is considered primarily an economic concept for efficiently 
sharing damages.98  It described PPP as “the principle to be used 
for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control measures 
to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and 
to avoid distortions in international trade and investment.”99  The 
goal for the principle was “to ensure that the environment is in an 
acceptable state.”100 
 
 97. See generally NICOLAS SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM 
POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES 23-32 (2000). 
 98. ORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, No. C(72) 
128, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMICS: GUIDING PRINCIPLES CONCERNING 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES annex para. 
(A)(a)(4) (1972). 
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The OECD eventually adopted a broader interpretation of 
PPP as a liability concept and not simply as a cost allocation 
principle.101  The idea of PPP was interpreted by the secretariat of 
the International Law Commission as an extension of civil 
liability concepts.102  In recent OECD documents, staff indicate 
that “environmental liability is an important instrument of 
implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle” and that PPP 
should have “deterrent effects.”103 
In analyzing the dual economic and liability paradigms of the 
concept, Hans Christian Bugge describes PPP as an 
environmental economics principle which promotes the “efficiency 
principle of internalization of environmental costs” as well as a 
legal principle which promotes “liability and compensation for 
environmental damage.”104  While fusing law with economics has 
emerged as an influential theoretical approach, treating PPP as 
both an economic and a legal principle has failed to effectively 
promote justice or create justice-generating norms.  In fact the 
fused approach of PPP as a law and economic principle has led in 
part to PPP being the source of “doubts and criticism in economic 
theory as well as in politics.”105 
Instead of attempting to negotiate a dual economic and legal 
approach to PPP, PPP as applied to global problems should focus 
on the principles of equity and fairness rather than as a means of 
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 104. Hans Christian Bugge, The Polluter Pays Principle: Dilemmas of Justice 
in National and International Contexts, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN 
CONTEXT 411 (Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2009). 
 105. Id. at 412. 
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efficiently distributing loss.  Given industry’s increasing 
knowledge of the social costs of industrial pollution coupled with 
industry’s refusal to take responsibility in areas such as 
hazardous waste disposal (the shipping of hazardous waste such 
as electronic waste from North American dumps to overseas 
dumps in developing countries) and large natural resource 
extraction, the legal aspects of PPP should be deemed to trump 
any application of the economic components of the principle. 
Fairness and equity may not always result in efficient results. 
In its purest legal form, PPP is a doctrine that when applied 
in a global context could exemplify the goals of corrective 
justice.106  It rectifies wrongs and endeavors to make parties whole 
even when it requires substantial and inefficient economic 
sacrifices from a polluter.  Applying it in its purest form, PPP 
provides relief for not only economic damages but also social costs 
and environmental costs.  It can correct systemic discrimination 
by holding parties accountable for both the intended and 
unintended consequences of their actions. 
In spite of the evolution of PPP into a liability concept, PPP 
has only been rarely applied as a remedy for distributive or 
corrective justice.107  While the principle is widely recognized, PPP 
has not played a particularly robust role in legal theory given its 
treatment in negotiations as a relatively amorphous principle. 
After its debut at the OECD as a named principle, PPP has 
appeared in numerous international documents starting with the 
1986 Single European Act, designed to unify and liberalize 
 
 106. Id. at 420 (describing how holding a person responsible for pollution 
damages regardless of fault under a PPP analysis would support “a clear 
principle corrective justice.”). 
 107. See Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) Supp 5 SCR 
241. In this case, an environmental citizen group sued the government to 
demand regulation of tanneries in Tamil Nadu who were discharging large 
quantities of untreated effluent into agricultural fields and public waterways 
resulting in 35,000 hectares of land damage and water contamination. The 
Court ordered the government to establish an environmental authority to deal 
with Tamil Nadu’s polluting industries, to identify local victims of pollution, and 
to seek compensation which would reverse environmental damage. Polluters 
who refused to pay whole compensation would be shut down and compensation 
for victims would be recovered from the sale of polluters’ assets. In shutting 
down non-responsive polluters, the Supreme Court of India made a decisive 
move to pursue the equities of remedying pollution damages over the efficiencies 
of economic development and cost allocation. 
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European markets. 108  The EU nations committed themselves so 
that “action by the Community relating to the environment shall 
be based on principles that preventive action should be taken, 
that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at 
the source, and that the polluter should pay.”109  No definition was 
offered for what constitutes “action by the Community relating to 
the environment” or how to ensure that the polluter pays for 
environmental damage. 
PPP was also included in the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development but in an equally vague fashion. 
The Rio representatives conceived of PPP as an emerging 
principle of international law and described it in the tepid 
language of Principle 16 where governments agreed to “endeavor 
to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use 
of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that 
the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with 
due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment.”110  The choice emasculates 
PPP as a legal principle providing only that “in principle” parties 
should “endeavor” to take certain actions. 
Yet in spite of the lack of specificity of what an international 
application of PPP requires from the polluter and from an 
oversight agency, there is a prevailing theme in most of the 
treaties and other international environmental documents where 
PPP appears, that the application of this principle is grounded in 
equity, fairness, and accountability rather than merely in 
economic efficiency.111 
 
 108. 1986 Single European Act, art.130r(2), (Feb. 17, 1986), Official Journal of 
the European Communities, No. L. 169/11. 
 109. Id. 
 110. U.N. Dep’t of Econ & Soc Affairs [DESA], Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, Annex 1, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, August 12, 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 
12, 1992). 
 111. See, e.g., Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Sustainable 
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of The Northeast Pacific, 
Feb. 18 2002; Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused 
by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters 
to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, May 21, 2003; Convention on 
civil liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment, 
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In order to address the social challenges inherent in climate 
change, insurance makes sense as a fair accountability 
mechanism because it contributes to an ex ante solution. 
Insurance has an important role in managing risk up front rather 
than analyzing risky behavior after the fact as in an ordinary 
liability context. This ex ante versus ex post approach to risk 
management has the potential to secure some changes in 
mitigating emissions in the short-term rather than waiting for 
long-term consequences of climate change and then apportioning 
of liability.  In addition, insurance has the possibility of 
contributing to new risk management practices that may 
eventually decelerate the pace of climate change.  Insurers can 
create the conditions for needed emission reductions by assigning 
high premiums to major emitters.  High premiums may stimulate 
innovation or new policies in corporate energy use, methane 
capture, or low carbon delivery of goods and services. 
Purists may argue that insurance that has policy caps can 
never satisfy PPP because polluters under any given claim would 
only cover a portion of incurred damages.  If the government 
incurs costs, the polluter will not have paid.  But nothing in the 
principle indicates that the polluter pays all.  As far as the goals 
of distributive justice are concerned, mandatory insurance 
ensures that key polluters contribute fairly to public disaster 
services thereby redistributing the current financial burden on 
the government. As far as the goals of corrective justice are 
concerned, insurance ensures that polluters are held at least 
partially accountable for the environmental consequences of their 
business decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Presently, the insurance industry is watching the ongoing 
climate change negotiations carefully in order to understand how 
it might impact existing property and casualty policies.  This 
proposal comes at an important time in the U.S. given the 
ongoing congressional discussions regarding whether federal 
reinsurance should be made available to cover state catastrophe 
funds.  Florida Democrat Ron Klein argues that 100% taxpayer 
 
June 21, 1993; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992. 
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funded reinsurance is necessary to ensure that states can respond 
to new climate change pressures.112 
The proposal in this paper for mandatory third-party 
catastrophe risk insurance would more equitably distribute the 
costs of climate change between the government as the “ultimate 
reinsurer” and major greenhouse gas emitters who have benefited 
from maintaining the status quo greenhouse gas intensive 
economy.  Unlike the current bills proposed in Congress to 
federally backstop state catastrophe funds, this paper’s proposal 
for mandatory insurance ensures a major role for the private 
insurance industry113 as not just a risk manager but more 
importantly as an unparalleled source of private governance with 
a financial incentive to ensure timely mitigation of existing 
climate catastrophe risks.  The proposed insurance would benefit 
from early adoption by nations to bolster efforts of disaster relief 
agencies to prepare for the improbable but not impossible events 
predicted by scientists.114 
Much has been written and said about corporate social 
responsibility in the past decades.  Mandatory corporate 
insurance provides industries with the opportunity to 
demonstrate their social responsibility.  The product requires 
insurance industries to follow Lloyds of London’s directive to its 
insurers to go out and “engage with the wider world through 
 
 112. Dipka Bhambhani, Federal Insurance Considered for Climate Change 
Disasters, CLEAN SKIES, Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.cleanskies.com/articles/ 
lawmakers-consider-federal-disaster-insurance-amid-threat-climate-change-
disasters. 
 113. American Insurance Association is currently opposing the Homeowners 
Defense Act designed to provide federal reinsurance for state catastrophe funds. 
As their spokesperson observed, “[a]lthough well-intended, H.R. 2555 will not 
generate new private sector insurance, reinsurance or capital market capacity. 
Instead, it is more likely to encourage the development of state programs that 
will displace the private market and require a federal government bailout in the 
event of a catastrophe.” House Panel Face Environmental, Insurer Groups over 
Catastrophe Bill, INS. J., Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.insurancejournal.com/ 
news/national/2010/03/10/108014.htm. 
 114. Matthew Moore, Copenhagen Climate Summit: Global Warming Disaster 
Predictions, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/ 
copenhagen-climate-changeconfe/6726226/Copenhagen-climate-change-summit-
the-key-countries-and-what-they-want-us.html (predicting that an increase of 2 
degrees Celsius cause acidification that will devastate shellfish stocks, 20 to 
30% food and water shortages in Asia, 20 to 30% loss of biodiversity, and more 
damaging extreme weather events). 
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meaningful, tangible partnerships to mitigate risk.“115  The 
product requires major greenhouse gas emitters to accept 
accountability and ensure that greenhouse gas mitigation is a 
core function of their activities.  Leaving aside all of the details of 
how best to implement the product, the concept behind insuring 
the public at large against catastrophic climate events is simple: 
those who profit the most from the greenhouse gas intensive 
markets will pay until they innovate. 
 
 
 
 115. Lloyds of London, supra note 1, at 13. 
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